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Abstract 
The investment climate in the country depends largely on the level of confidence of potential investors, which 
actualizes the need to provide transparent and quality financial reporting to economic entities. Powerful 
corporations that have established an effective corporate governance mechanism are able to provide high 
competitive advantage over the long term, contributing to their financial and economic stability. The purpose 
of the article is to determine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the quality of a company's 
financial statements. The corporate governance rules in force in Saudi Arabia were developed in 2006, then 
revised twice in 2009 and 2015, and only finally approved in 2017. The survey was based on the results of an 
electronic survey of 56 Saudi financial analysts selected from their LinkedIn profiles (financial analysts were 
selected by respondents because they play a significant role in the capital markets and are users of financial 
statements). The author points out that the objectivity of the survey results can be enhanced by expanding the 
sample of survey participants. The questionnaire contained 11 questions about corporate governance and its 
contribution to improving the quality of the financial statements of the respective companies. The results of 
the survey have empirically confirmed that corporate governance is a factor contributing to improving the 
quality of financial reporting and, consequently, increasing foreign investment inflows, so compliance with 
the new corporate governance rules is extremely important for Saudi Arabia corporations. Improvements in 
corporate governance mechanisms are perceived by members of boards of directors, audit committees, and 
internal audit departments as one of the main factors in improving the quality of financial reporting. 
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Introduction  
Interests of corporation managers and directors often differ from those of owners (Berle and Means, 1932). 
Agency problems arise when executives make investment, financing, and operating decisions in their own 
interests in ways that are not aligned with stakeholders’ interests. Giant corporations such as Enron, 
WorldCom, and Tyco witnessed bankruptcies in the early 2000s, which were associated with fraud in corporate 
reporting. Lack of integrity in the executive management may lead to their prioritizing their self-interests while 
neglecting stakeholders’ interest. Managing earnings through fraudulent reporting or other means with the 
intent of affecting share prices for their gain might come at the expense of other stakeholders, particularly 
parties that finance the corporation (Ioana and Mariana, 2014). These factors highlight the need for more 
regulations and governance. To mitigate such agency problems, corporate governance has been implemented 
as a monitoring system in various organizations (Watson and Hirsch, 2010).  
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 Corporate governance can be defined as a set of control mechanisms that an organization adopts to prevent or 
constraint potential self-benefiting managers from engaging in activities that harm the interests of stakeholders 
and shareholders (Larcker and Tayan, 2011). The laws, policies, and directives introduced by corporate 
governance affect a corporation's way of controlling and monitoring (Buallay et al., 2017). It also enhances 
transparence and clarity in the relationship between the corporation and its stakeholders to obviate conflicting 
interests (Buallay et al., 2017). Corporations that have established a strong corporate governance mechanism 
can enhance their corporate value in the long term and secure competitive advantages that contribute to 
increasing their social wealth (Watson and Hirsch, 2010). According to a survey by McKinsey & Company 
(2002), investors place corporate governance at par with financial indicators when evaluating investment 
decisions; in fact, many investors are willing to pay a premium for a well-governed company.  
Corporate governance is significant and relevant for corporations that prioritize foreign investment. Analyzing 
mutual funds that hold equity in 37 countries, Das (2014) concludes that corporate governance practices play 
a role in attracting foreign investors by reducing information asymmetry. Corporation owners can receive only 
second-hand information as executive managers are directly and closely involved in day-to-day operations of 
the corporation, and thus, they suffer from lack of information regarding the extent to which managers are 
performing their job in an optimal manner and in the best interests of the corporation (Watson and Hirsch, 
2010). Since information asymmetry is an identifying characteristic of the corporate model for business, an 
internal “watchdog” is a necessary mechanism for shareholders and parties, on which the shareholders can 
depend to make informed decisions.  Saudi Arabia recently issued its Vision 2030 initiative, which highlights 
foreign investment as an important objective. Building trust and restoring confidence in financial reporting is 
of significance in attracting international investors. Corporate governance can help establish confidence in a 
country’s capital market (Ahmed and Hamdan, 2015). This study focuses on corporate governance’s 
contribution to enhancing the quality of financial reporting. Specifically, it empirically investigates financial 
analysts’ perceptions in Saudi Arabia to determine the extent to which corporate governance enhances the 
quality of financial reporting. The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: the next section reviews the relevant 
literature. The third section presents the methods used to collect data. The fourth section discusses the results, 
and the last section concludes with the limitations of the study and suggestions for future research. 
Literature Review 
Humans tend to take advantage of ineffectual prospects (Jensen and Meckling, 1994); similarly, cooperation 
between corporate management and the owner encourages them to undertake actions for self-interest at the 
cost of the other party’s interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). For example, directors might be involved in 
embezzling from corporate assets for their personal gain (Watson and Hirsch, 2010). Corruption in a corporate 
model can harm the corporation by encouraging misbehavior by insiders to serve their own interests. In fact, 
deficiency or absence of corporate governance was one of the main causes of the collapse of giant corporations 
such as Enron and WorldCom (Umm Kulthum et al., 2014). These highlight the need for effective governance. 
Arguably, corporate governance can be a mitigating devise that protects the interests of stakeholders and users 
of corporate reporting (Merag and Adam [مدآ و جارعم], 2012; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; 2003). 
In this regard, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) aimed at designing 
policies to improve economic welfare around the globe. The OECD has adopted six principles for corporate 
governance: The first principle is to ensure the basis for an effective corporate governance framework. The 
second principle is concerned with the rights of shareholders and key ownership functions. The third principle 
emphasizes the equitable treatment of shareholders. The fourth principle is related to the role of stakeholders 
in corporate governance. The fifth principle focuses on disclosure and transparency, and the last principle 
details the responsibilities of the board (OECD, 2004). 
Several countries have implemented these principles for effective corporate governance to reduce the conflicts 
of interest in corporations and achieve a workable corporate model. In Jordan, Al Ramahi et al. (2014) find an 
increase in the application of these principles in the listed companies on the first market in the Amman Stock 
Exchange. Examining the consequences of the application of these principles on the quality of financial 
reporting in private universities in Jordan, Alweshah and Shaheen ([ شو حاشولاانيه ], 2017) report that the 
aforementioned principles contribute significantly to enhancing the quality of financial reporting. Another 
study on Jordanian listed industrial companies document a relationship between the six principles of corporate 
governance and quality of financial reporting (Al-Sufy et al., 2013). Empirical evidence also suggests that the 
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six principles contributed to enhancing the accounting disclosure and the quality of financial reporting of listed 
companies in the Khartoum Stock Exchange (Al-Qusi [يصوقلا], 2015). Analyzing the Tehran Stock Exchange, 
Salehi et al. (2017) report a significant relationship between corporate governance and the disclosure quality 
of financial statements of corporations. According to accountants and financial analysts in the Malaysian 
banking sector, better quality of financial reporting can be achieved by separating the board leadership’s roles, 
increasing the proportion of independent non-executive directors, minimizing ownership by directors, and 
increasing the board size (Htay et al., 2013). In Egypt, Albaz ( [زابلا], 2012) report a direct correlation between 
the application of corporate governance principles (disclosure and transparency) and the quality of financial 
reporting.  However, empirical findings in Iraq point to a negative relationship between the quality of financial 
reporting and disclosure, as well as between the seniority of shareholders on the boards of directors and the 
boards’ efficiency (Alfadl [لضفلا], 2014).  
Shedding Light on the Saudi Capital Market 
Although the corporate governance structure in Saudi Arabia is considered better than other countries in the 
Middle East (Al-Aali et al., 2014: 1332), the efficiency of the Saudi capital market is low (Al-Adeem [ميدعلا], 
2017; see also Al-Salman, 2007; Alzahrani, 2010; Alabaas [ سابع لآ], 2008), and accordingly, most studies 
analyzing the effectiveness of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia assume weak efficiency (Al-Adeem and 
Al-Sogair, 2019). However, the trends observed in the Saudi capital market are no different than those in most 
other countries.  Managers of publicly traded corporations are incentivized to manage corporate earnings by 
increasing their compensation, leveraging the capital structure, and smoothing corporate income profit 
(Habbash and Alghamdi, 2015). Corporate governance and the structure of ownership both affect voluntary 
disclosure in annual reports of Saudi listed firms (Habbash, 2014). Government ownership also affects 
corporate governance and corporate disclosure in Saudi corporations (Al-Janadi et al., 2016). In general, 
institutional ownership (Hamdan and Al-Sartawi, 2013) and government ownership (Al-Janadi et al., 2016) 
influence various dimensions of corporate governance. Whereas government ownership affects governorate 
disclosure and governance. Surprisingly, Al-Shabeeb and Al-Adeem ([ميدعلاو بيبشلا], 2019) document that 
earnings management may not be perceived as entirely unethical by some stakeholders in Saudi Arabia—
namely, the users of financial statements. Moreover, whether such users perceive an enhancement in the quality 
of corporate reporting as due to corporate governance is unknown. Thus, examining the perceptions of financial 
analysts as users of corporate reporting regarding the quality of such reporting will add to our knowledge. 
This study contributes to the body of accounting knowledge by investigating the perception of financial 
statement users regarding the enhancement of corporate reporting quality after Saudi Arabia issued its 
Corporate Governance Regulations—launched in 2006 and then later revised twice in 2009 and 2015. 
Furthermore, in 2015, the new Companies’ Law was enacted, encouraging yet another update to the Corporate 
Governance Regulations, which was finally implemented in 2017. Two empirical studies, however, document 
that there was no concurrent improvement in “firms’ operational and financial performance in the listed 
companies in Saudi stock exchange” (Buallay et al., 2017: 94) nor in the effectiveness of corporate governance 
in monitoring executive management (Al-Adeem and Al-Sogiar, 2019). 
Research Method 
Financial analysts were selected as the respondents because they play a significant role in capital markets 
(Fogarty and Rogers, 2005). Furthermore, they also serve as users of financial statements (Horngren, 1978), 
which is suitable for this study. A published survey developed by Ibrahim and Makiah ([ةيكمو ميهربا], 2011) 
was employed for data collection. The survey included 11 items on corporate governance and its contribution 
to enhancing the quality of financial reporting. Necessary modifications were made to the instrument to make 
it suitable for the Saudi Arabian context: first, we changed the point scale titled (agree somewhat) to (I do not 
know). Second, the questionnaire was translated from Arabic to English and then made available for 
participants in both languages. The Arabic version was used because it is the main language in Saudi Arabia 
and the intent was to reach as many respondents as possible. The English version was used because many 
financial analysts in Saudi Arabia use English for communication. Before issuing the questionnaire to 
participants, the translated documents were reviewed by two accounting academics. Electronic questionnaires 
were prepared and a pilot study conducted with graduate students who possess research knowledge. All issues 
raised by the pilot study participants regarding the content were addressed. Finally, we identified financial 
analysts in Saudi Arabia through information on their LinkedIn profiles, and then sent the questionnaire 
electronically via email or LinkedIn. 
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Research Findings 
A total of 56 financial analysts responded to the survey. Table (1) shows that about 50% of the respondents 
hold a Bachelor's degree, 46% hold a Master's degree, and 2% each hold a higher diploma or a PhD degree. 
Table 1. Distribution of the Sample by Academic Qualification 
 Frequency Ratio 
Bachelor’s degree 28 50% 
Higher diploma 1 2% 
Master’s degree 26 46% 
Ph.D. 1 2% 
Total  56 100% 
Source: by the authors. 
Table 2 indicates that most respondents (70%) have less than 10 years of work experience. About 16% have less 
than 15 years of experience, while 13% have experience of 15 to 20 years. Only 2% have more than 20 years of 
experience.  
Table 2. Distribution of the Sample by Years of Experience 
 Frequency Ratio 
Less than 10 years 39 70% 
From 10 to 15 years 9 16% 
From 15 to 20 years 7 13% 
More than 20 years 1 2% 
Total 56 100% 
Source: by the authors. 
Table (3) presents the values of the scale points of the questionnaire and the five class intervals, which were 
calculated as follows: Class width = (the maximum value - the minimum value)/the number of the scale points. 
By this formula, we obtained a class width of 0.80. 
Table 3. Weighted Values of the Point Scales and Class Intervals 
 
Strongly 
disagree Disagree Do not know Agree Strongly agree 
Values of the scale points 1 2 3 4 5 
Class intervals 1 - 1.80 1.81 - 2.60 2.61 - 3.40 3.41- 4.20 4.21 - 5 
Source: Al-Amri (  ] [يرمعلا2011:17 ). 
Table (4) shows the descriptive statistics of the data. The averages of the responses are ranked in descending 
order. The mean of item (4) is 4.48, with a standard deviation of 0.69. The maximum score for this item is 5, 
while the minimum score is 2. The mean is within the “strongly agree” class interval, which indicates that 
implementation of governance mechanisms of the board of directors, audit committees, internal audit 
departments, and professional rules of practice is perceived as the leading cause of enhancement in the quality 
of financial reporting. The mean of item (1) is 4.46, with a standard deviation of 0.69. Again, the maximum 
score is 5 and the minimum score is 2. The mean falls within the “strongly agree” class interval, which indicates 
that the sampled financial analysts regard adoption of corporate governance as reinforcing confidence in 
accounting information by achieving the quality comprehensively defined by information based on legal, 
professional, technical, and regulatory criteria. The mean of item (3) is 4.39, with a standard deviation of 0.80. 
The mean lies within the “strongly agree” class interval. Thus, we can infer that the respondents consider the 
adoption of corporate governance to help in creating a transparent and credible environment. The mean of item 
(2) is 4.36, with a standard deviation of 0.72. Thus, the respondents strongly agree that participants’ confidence 
in the capital markets is reinforced through the adoption of corporate governance. The mean of item (5) is 4.32, 
with a standard deviation of 0.94. Thus, respondents agree that the adoption of corporate governance strongly 
enhances confidence in the information of financial statements.   With means of 4.16, 4.04, 4, 3.88, 3.66, and 
3.55, respectively, the respondents agreed on items (6), (7), (8), (9), (11) and (10)—that these factors enhance 
the quality of financial reporting. Thus, the overall results suggest that the subjects perceive corporate 
governance to be a contributing factor to the enhancement of the quality of financial reporting. This result is 
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further supported by the grand mean of the means of all the items, which is as high as 4.12. Graph (1) presents 
the distribution of responses to the survey questions; it clearly shows that many respondents “strongly agree” 
and “agree” to the questionnaire items. 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for All Items 
 
 
 
 
Item  Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagr
ee 
I don't 
Know 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Mean SD Max Mini 
 4) Implementing the 
governance mechanisms of the 
board of directors, audit 
committees, internal audit 
departments, and professional 
rules of practice enhances the 
quality of financial reporting. 
Count  2  23 31 4٫48 0٫69 5 2 
 Ratio  4%  41% 55%     
 1) The adoption of corporate 
governance reinforces 
confidence in accounting 
information by achieving the 
quality comprehensively 
defined in information based on 
legal, professional, technical, 
and regulatory criteria. 
Count  2  24 30 4٫46 0٫69 5 2 
 Ratio  3.5%  43% 53,5%     
3) The adoption of corporate 
governance helps in creating a 
transparent and credible 
environment. 
Count  2 5 18 31 4٫39 0٫80 5 2 
 Ratio  4% 9% 32% 55%     
 2) The adoption of corporate 
governance reinforces 
participants’ confidence in 
capital markets. 
Count  2 2 26 26 4٫36 0٫72 5 2 
 Ratio  4% 4% 46% 46%     
5) Implementation of corporate 
governance increases 
confidence in financial 
statements as it includes legal 
and regulatory aspects and leads 
to improvement in accounting 
practices. 
Count 1 4  22 29 4٫32 0٫94 5 1 
 Ratio 2% 7%  39% 52%     
 6) Implementation of corporate 
governance leads to the 
establishment of legal criteria 
that reflect the laws and 
regulations of the corporation to 
assess the quality of accounting 
information. 
Count  1 6 32 17 4٫16 0٫68 5 2 
 Ratio  2% 11% 57% 30%     
7) Implementation of corporate 
governance leads to the 
establishment of regulatory 
criteria that reflect the current 
regulations and control 
techniques to assess the quality 
of accounting information. 
Count  5 4 31 16 4٫04 0٫85 5 2 
 Ratio  9% 7% 55% 29%     
8) Implementation of corporate 
governance leads to the 
establishment of professional 
criteria that reflect the extent to 
which accounting and auditing 
standards are applied to assess 
the quality of accounting 
information. 
Count  4 8 28 16 4٫00 0٫85 5 2 
 Ratio  7% 14% 50% 29%     
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Table 4 (cont.). Descriptive Statistics for All Items 
 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of Items 
Source: by the authors. 
Conclusion  
Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 considers attracting foreign investment an important objective. For this, 
confidence in the financial reporting of publicly traded corporations needs to be boosted. This study 
empirically investigated whether corporate governance contributes to the enhancement of the quality of 
financial reporting. We assessed the perception of financial analysts to examine the value added of corporate 
governance to the quality of corporate reporting, as perceived by users of financial statements.  We found that 
corporate governance is a contributing factor to the enhancement of the quality of financial reporting. However, 
our study is limited in its sample size: findings from a small sample may not be generalizable beyond the 
respondents. Therefore, future studies should investigate this research issue with more participants. 
Researchers should also examine the extent to which Saudi corporations comply with the new corporate 
governance regulations and the impact of corporate governance regulations on foreign investment in Saudi 
Arabia. 
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Item  Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagr
ee 
I don't 
Know 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Mean SD Max Mini 
9) Implementation of 
corporate governance leads to 
the establishment of technical 
criteria that reflect the 
availability of accounting 
information characteristics to 
assess the quality of 
accounting information. 
Count  5 9 30 12 3٫88 0٫85 5 2 
 Ratio  9% 16% 54% 21%     
11) Corporations that 
implement corporate 
governance are oriented 
towards investment. 
Count 3 7 14 14 18 3٫66 1٫21 5 1 
 Ratio 5% 13% 25% 25% 32%     
10) Implementation of 
corporate governance leads to 
the establishment of 
comprehensive criteria to 
assess the quality of 
accounting information. 
Count  12 8 29 7 3٫55 0٫97 5 2 
 Ratio  21% 14% 52% 13%     
Grand Mean       4.12    
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